

EUTHYPHRO
Notes
EUTHYPHRO
(right-minded, sincere)

Suppose...
1) IN A CAR, HEAR A BUMP, LATER
DISCOVER THAT SOMEONE IN FACT DIED.
• FATHER • FRIEND • LOVER
~~CONFETTI~~ MORAL DILEMMA

cf. Antigone, Abraham

Also, outside the Court House

Performative: Shows the difficulty of the certainty of certain moral positions

collision between
moral/legal
old/new

Socrates an accused, Euthyphro an accuser. Socrates himself is accused of impiety, of violating the laws of the gods (read, morality) in the name of his own laws. Moral and legal transgression.

Socrates claims to be guided by his "inner" daimon, a daimon which reveals to him the overall truth. In this way, Socrates is, in some way, a mystic. That is, though he uses reason and philosophy to argue and critique, the grounds for his action are ultimately mystical.


Perhaps
wholly
subjective

MORAL TENSION/
DILEMMA

In a way, they both make claims to know the universal.

In the end, Euthyphro is shown not to be so certain, perhaps wholly ignorant, and he scurries off in frustration...

dissonance between the face-to-face relation, especially between father and son, and the relation to some external (universal) principle, here personified as "the gods."



Ends with the ethical question

What is the ground of what is right? Does it exist apart from the messiness of human relationships?

What is the "North Star" of action? A moral dilemma is presented here, between horizontal piety and vertical piety, two competing orientations for grounds for morality, grounds for action

Prime facie, it seems that it is not such an easy calculation when the perpetrator is a relative

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What's new, Socrates, to make you leave your usual haunts in the Lyceum

E: But **someone has indicted you?**

Socrates: Quite so.

S:...He says he knows how our young men are corrupted and who corrupts them...

it is right to care first that the young should be as good as possible.

E:...He seems to me to start out by harming the very heart of the city by attempting to wrong you.

S:...on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods.

↓
READ: UNIVERSAL

Does the "horizontal" relation
supposed the "vertical" adherence
to the ideal? (Piety, Justice)

EUTHYPHRO

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[The accusation that he bases his morality on some different authority. The "gods" here only represent the ethical ground of authority, the city's laws. Let us not import too much of our assumptions about God and Divine Command]

E:....Whenever I speak of divine matters in the assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were crazy

[Both Euthyphro and Socrates are supposed to be anomalies, mad, rabble rousers.]

S:...to be laughed at does not matter...for the Athenians do not mind anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom.

S:...I'm afraid that my liking for people makes them think that I pour out to anybody anything I have to say, not only without charging a fee but even glad to reward anyone who is willing to listen.

E: Perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, and you will fight your case as you think best, as I think I will mine.

E: The prosecutor.
My father.

S: ...most men would not know how they could do this and be right. It is not the part of anyone to do this, but of one who is far advanced in wisdom.

E:...It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whether the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not.

The pollution is the same if you knowingly keep company with such a man and do not cleanse yourself and him by bring him to justice.

He killed one of our household slaves in a drunken anger, so my father bound him hand and foot...

Hunger and cold and his bonds cause his death.

But their ideas of divine attitude to **piety and impiety** are wrong, Socrates.

S: ...that in the past too I considered knowledge about the divine to be most important

S:...or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents with one form or appearance insofar as it is impious?

E: **the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious.**

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These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father for similar reason. But they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me.

S:....told by the poets

S:I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious.

[the 3rd thing]

S:....the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad

S: The same things then are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and would be both god-loved and god-hated.

S: Then they do not dispute that the wrongdoer must be punished, but they may disagree as to who the wrongdoer is, what he did, and when.

S: Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me, too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods consider that man to have been killed unjustly who became a murderer while in your service

E: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.

10a

Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO PROBLEM

S: It is being loved then because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved?

S: we agree that the pious is being loved for this reason, that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved. Is that not so?

E: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it.

E: I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not the one who makes them go around and not remain in the same place; it is you who are the Daedalus; for as far as I am concerned they would remain as they were.

S:....I disagree with the poet.

E: I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.

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S: You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of information. I do not know yet what you mean by care, for you do not mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things, as, for example, we say, don't we, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, but the horse breeder does.

S: It aims to benefit the object of its care?

E: the kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.

S: I understand. It is likely to be a kind of served of the gods.

S: ...what is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants?

S: Well then, how would you sum up the many fine things that the gods achieve?

S: It would follow from this statement that piety would be a knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods.

S: Piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men?

E: What else, do you think, than honor, reverence, and what I mention just now, to please them?

S: The pious is then, Euthyphro, pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?

S:...You surely remember that earlier the pious and the god-loved were shown not to be the same but different from each other.

E: Some other time, Socrates, for I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go.